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The paper empirically explores the international linkages between gender inequality and
trade flows of a sample of 92 developed and developing countries. The focus is on
comparative advantage in labour-intensive manufactured goods. The results indicate that
gender wage inequality is positively associated with comparative advantage in labour-
intensive goods, that is, countries with a larger gender wage gap have higher exports of
these goods. Also, gender inequality in labour force activity rates and educational
attainment rates are negatively linked with comparative advantage in labour-intensive
commodities.
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1.  Introduction 
The 20th century has been marked by a widespread movement towards gender equality.
Though this has led to better opportunities for women, especially in industrialised
countries, a sometimes shocking picture can be seen in a few developing countries where
equality is still a faraway goal. The mortality rate for girls and women, for example, is
much higher in South Asia and China in comparison to their male counterparts (Sen,
1989; Klasen, 1994). Especially in developing countries, education differs dramatically
between genders, and pay gaps also exist (ILO, 2003a). To exemplify the gender-based
wage gap, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP, 1995) mentions
Bangladesh, where female workers in the non-agricultural sector only earn 42 % of the
wages of their male counterparts.
Apart from the sometimes severe human suffering of individual females that are subject to
discrimination, the economic consequences for the country affected can be substantial. To
begin with, gender bias may reduce economic growth rates. This link has been well
established in the literature by Drèze and Sen (1989), Pritchett and Summers (1996), and
Klasen (2002). Above all, gender discrimination may discourage workers from entering a
job to which they are best suited, thereby lowering the value of output. Also, a gender
bias in education implies that females will be less well educated and, hence, less skilled.
Lower human capital levels, in turn, are likely to affect GDP growth rates negatively.
Moreover, inequality in access to resources and in particular in education may inhibit
reductions in child mortality and fertility rates and prevents the expansion in education of
the next generation. These important development policy goals are closely linked to the
educational attainment levels of the female population (Summers, 1994; Murthi, Guio and
Drèze, 1995). To the extent that these linkages exist, gender bias in education may thus
prevent progress in the improvement in well-being of the people in a considerable number
of developing countries.
Furthermore, there is also concern that gender inequality may affect the (cost)
competitiveness of countries by lowering (female) wages, thereby influencing trade flows.3
Along these lines, gender inequality has been debated within a wider range of topics
related to basic labour standards, which also include child and forced labour as well as
union rights. In particular, fears have been stated that there might be a “race to the
bottom” on such standards (OECD, 2000). Rich countries like those of the European
Union and the United States have insisted on the inclusion of binding rules within the
World Trade Organisation (WTO) to ensure a level playing field and to deal effectively
with fundamental workers’ rights. Developing countries, on the other hand, fear that high-
income countries are likely to excuse protectionist trade measures against foreign
competition by accusing their low-cost competitors of abusing labour standards.
How could a gender bias influence trade flows? In a standard Heckscher-Ohlin trade
model, using capital and labour as the main production factors, the impact depends on
changes in relative factor endowments. If two (developing) countries both have a
relatively large workforce, then an enlargement in the supply of labour by, for instance,
an increase in the female labour force in only one country would lead to an improvement
in its comparative advantage in labour intensive products. Note that standard international
trade theory does not address wage inequalities, since it assumes that these do not exist in
highly competitive markets, at least in the long run. According to Becker (1971), gender
wage gaps may occur if employers have, for instance, a preference for discrimination
(based on socio-cultural habits) and are able and willing to afford it, as the firm will be
worse off. In an open economy, trade would lead to increased competition, making it
much more costly for employers to discriminate. As a consequence, gender wage gaps
which cannot be explained by differences in educational attainment are likely to be
reduced.
Yet we do observe gender inequality in wage remuneration not only in closed, but also in
more open economies, which raises some concern about the fundamental assumptions in
neoclassical trade models and places emphasis on the importance of exploring the
linkages between gender inequality and international trade. Oostendorp (2004), for
example, finds that increased trade narrows the wage gap for unskilled labour in both
developing and developed countries, but this does not apply to skilled labour. Focusing on4
the United States, the results reported by Black and Brainerd (2004) support the
prediction that increased competition from trade benefits females by reducing employers’
power to discriminate.
1
On the other hand, the results reported by Seguino (1997, 2000b), who analyses the link
between gender wage inequality and export (and growth) performance in a number of
semi-industrialised, export-oriented countries, show that gender imbalances may have
contributed to the export success of several countries. Also, Berik et al. (2004) examine
the trade performance of (South) Korea and Taiwan (China), two highly open economies,
and find that competition from trade in competitive industries is positively associated
with wage discrimination against females in these two countries. In a further study,
Osterreich (2002) demonstrates that gender wage gaps are negatively related to the terms
of trade for manufactured goods in semi-industrialised countries, that is, more
discrimination leads to lower export prices and a worsening of the terms of trade.
Regarding the female labour supply, Busse (2002) shows that trade flows and the female
activity rate might be associated to some extent, but he focused his analysis more on basic
labour standards. Similarly, other studies analysed the impact of increasing globalisation
on female employment (Wood, 1991; Standing, 1989, 1999; Kucera and Milberg, 2000).
In general, an enlargement in trade might increase the number of jobs available for
females and/or fosters the concentration of females in export-oriented industries.
Conversely, Joekes (1995) notes that the percentage of (unskilled) females in the labour
force might peak at a certain level and then fall again over time, as the export structure of
the economy moves up to skilled products where (skilled) males outweigh females. 
Also, there is some anecdotal evidence of international connections between gender
inequality and trade. Rodrik (2000) reported that Mauritius set out on a development
strategy that depended on operating an export-processing zone. The segmentation of the
labour force along gender lines, with female workers predominately employed in the
export-processing zone, was crucial, as it ensured a large additional pool of low-wage
                                                
1 See also the literature surveys by Cagatay and Ertürk (2004) and UNCTAD (2004).5
workers with fewer rights for export production. Male workers, in contrast, have been
able to preserve their status in the remaining sectors of the economy. In another example,
Bhattacharya and Rahman (1999) observed that women in Bangladesh are likely to be
pushed into low-skilled/low-wage jobs in the ready-made garments industry, which might
explain Bangladesh’s export success in this sector. Summing up, the evidence available in
the literature has been rather limited and inconclusive. In particular, an extensive
empirical analysis of the linkages between trade in those labour-intensive products, where
women in developing countries are likely to work, and gender inequality seems to be
missing.
Against this background, the paper deals with three issues: (1) how to measure gender
inequality; (2) whether gender inequality is closely associated with the structure of trade
flows, that is, comparative advantage in labour-intensive manufactured goods (cross-
sectional analysis); and (3) whether that relationship holds over time in a panel data
analysis. Accordingly, the paper is structured as follows: The next section shows how
gender inequality can be defined and measured, whereas Section 3 briefly explains the
(empirical) model and data used. The results of the empirical analysis of the linkage
between gender inequality and comparative advantage in labour-intensive products are
presented in Section 4. Finally, some policy implications and concluding remarks are
found in Section 5.
2.  Measuring Gender Inequality 
There have been several attempts to measure female inequality across countries. In 1995,
the UNDP (1995) introduced two indicators to quantify the degree of gender inequality:
The Gender-related Development Index (GDI) and the Gender Empowerment Measure
(GEM). The GDI is based on three variables, namely life expectancy at birth, educational
attainment, which is measured by literacy rate and school enrolment, and access to
resources in terms of GDP per capita converted at purchasing power parity exchange
rates. These variables are also used to calculate the Human Development Index (HDI);6
however, the GDI adjusts the values for gender equality.
2 The GEM combines income
shares, professional opportunities and participation in economic decision-making
3 and
parliamentary participation as shares of parliamentary seats for both males and females. 
Common for both indicators is that they combine absolute values for the considered
indicators with a penalty for inequality.
4 Bardhan and Klasen (1999), Oudhof (2001) and
Dijkstra (2002) criticise the composition of both UNDP indices. In particular, they all
worry about an over-weighted income variable, as the GDI is strongly correlated with the
absolute level of income. GDI and GEM, therefore, may underestimate gender inequality
in richer countries. Dijkstra (2002) argues that these indicators do not just measure
inequality, since they combine absolute achievement levels with a valuation of inequality.
While various modifications have been suggested to overcome the shortages of the GDI
and the GEM,
5 most of them cannot solve the problem with the income variable. 
Against this background, we do not use these standard indicators as measures of gender
inequality in the following analysis, but rather rely on disaggregated measures for gender
imbalances in the labour market and education. More specifically, we measure gender
inequality in three dimensions: 
(1) Inequality in wage remuneration, computed as 1 minus the female divided by the male
wage rate in manufacturing times 100 (the variable is called Wage-inequality)
(2) Access to the labour market, quantified by relative female/male labour market activity
rates for individuals, ages 15-64 (Lab-inequality)
(3) Access to education, quantified by relative female/male literacy rates and relative
female/male gross secondary school enrolment, both weighted 1/2 (Edu-inequality)
6
                                                
2 More precisely, a penalty is introduced to express the weight which is given to equality, assuming that countries
have an aversion to inequality given by an aversion factor ε  (Oudhof, 2001).
3 This is measured by the proportion of male and female administrative, professional, technical and managerial
positions (Bardhan and Klasen, 1999).
4 For detailed derivation and discussion of both the GDI and the GEM, see UNDP (1995), Bardhan and Klasen
(1999), Oudhof (2001) and Dijkstra (2002).
5 Alternatives are described in Oudhof (2001), Bardhan and Klasen (1999) and Dijkstra (2002). For example, one
approach measures the GDI relative to the HDI, or the difference between the HDI and the GDI relative to the HDI.7
The first indicator is usually known as the gender wage gap. Note that a higher figure for
Wage-inequality implies increased gender inequality in remuneration, whereas larger
numbers for Lab-inequality and Edu-inequality indicate less inequality. In contrast to the
last two indicators, it is rather difficult to get comprehensive (gender) wage data for a
large number of developing countries. To ensure that we obtain a relatively consistent
data set, Wage-inequality has been calculated based on two International Labour
Organisation (ILO) sources: the Yearbook of Labour Statistics (ILO, 2003b) and the
October Inquiry (ILO, 2004b).
7 Both provide information on wages in manufacturing,
frequently at a disaggregated level and differentiated by sex. If available, we have singled
out female/male wage rates in labour-intensive manufacturing, as the following analysis
focuses on labour-intensive commodities.
However, for a considerable number of developing and even developed countries, there
are no meaningful wage data or consistent wage data over time at hand. In particular,
wage data distinguished by sex is lacking. Whereas the total number of countries included
in the empirical analysis is 92, we only have gender wage data differentiated by sex for 40
countries, namely 17 developed and 23 developing countries.
8 While this restricts the
implications of the subsequent results, we do think that a sufficient number of countries
are included, as the analysis covers most important developing countries that have high
trade figures in labour-intensive goods, such as China, Egypt, Malaysia, or Turkey.
In contrast to the gender wage gap and differences in access to education, inequality in
labour market participation rates does not necessarily involve gender discrimination, as
females may choose not to work or to work fewer hours if they take care of children or
other family members. Discrimination in access to jobs, in job promotion or wages, on the
other hand, may lead to a reduction in the female labour supply, thereby signalling
discrimination too. As we cannot determine whether differences in labour market
                                                                                                                                                             
6 Data sources for these and all other variables are reported in Appendix A.
7 Oostendorp (2004) provides an extensive description of the ILO October Inquiry database.
8 See Appendix B for the country sample. We have refrained from incorporating gender wage data from other
sources, since we do not know whether they are compatible with the ILO data.8
participation rates are voluntary or not, we prefer to use the term gender inequality rather
than discrimination.
The official definition given by the ILO describes discrimination in employment and
occupation as “[...] treating people differently and less favourably because of certain
characteristics, such as their sex [...] irrespective of their merit or the requirements of the
job” (ILO, 2003a, p. 15). So far, the ILO has set up two main conventions against
discrimination:
9 First, the Equal Remuneration Convention (No. 100) aims to ensure equal
pay not just for similar work but also for work of equal value. This idea takes into account
the fact that women and men tend to work in different occupations and calls for objective
measures to compare the relative value of one job with another. Second, the
Discrimination (Employment and Occupation) Convention (No. 111) tries to ensure non-
discriminatory treatment of all workers both in access to employment and during the
employment contract. This implies equality in educational and occupational opportunity
as well as participation in employment organisations and career advancement.
Employment-related welfare systems and job security should be equally accessible for
both male and female workers.
10 
To see whether the ratification of both ILO conventions is related to our three indicators,
we have computed a further variable, called Convention, representing the number of
ratified core ILO conventions on discrimination (the indicator takes the value zero, one or
two). Interestingly, ratifying the two ILO conventions seems to be a poor measure for the
extent of gender inequality, as the correlations with Wage-inequality, Lab-inequality and
Edu-inequality are rather low (Table 1). In 2000, the highest partial correlation is -0.26,
implying that countries with a smaller gender wage gap are more likely to ratify the two
                                                
9 Of course, the ILO not only focuses on gender discrimination, but also on discrimination based on skin colour,
religion, political beliefs or social origin.
10 Both conventions are part of eight conventions which were put together in 1998 to form the Declaration on
Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work: Freedom of Association and the Right of Collective Bargaining (C87
and C98), The elimination of all Forms of Forced and Compulsory labour (C29 and C105), The Elimination of
Discrimination in Respect of Employment and Occupation (C100 and C111) and the Effective Abolition of Child
Labour (C138 and C182), see ILO (1998).9
conventions on gender discrimination.
11 Since the linkage between ratification and
enforcement is rather low, we do not use Convention in our empirical analysis. Further,
richer countries have on average less gender inequality in wage remuneration, labour-
force participation rates and, in particular, access to education.










Lab-inequality 0.26 -0.24 1.00
Edu-inequality 0.51 -0.06 -0.16 1.00
Convention 0.01 -0.26 -0.09 0.02 1.00
Note:  GNI represents Gross National Income per capita, based on PPP (US $). Convention
represents the number of ratified ILO conventions on female discrimination as of 31 Dec. 2000.
3.  Trade Effects of Gender Inequality and Trade Indicators
After the introduction of the different measures of the extent of gender inequality, we
focus next on the empirical model and the data used in the analysis. As an appropriate
theoretical framework to analyse the linkages of trade flows and gender inequality, we use
a standard Heckscher-Ohlin trade model, assuming two countries, two goods (one labour-
and one capital-intensive) and two production factors (capital and labour). If we have
identical production technologies, constant returns to scale, identical and homogeneous
consumer preferences across countries and no market distortions, then a country is likely
to have a comparative advantage in the labour-intensive good if it is relatively labour
abundant and capital scarce.
                                                
11  There are different reasons for this discrepancy. First of all, ratifying a particular convention does not
automatically imply its thorough observance. For instance, Libya has ratified both conventions, but does not have a
strong record on gender equality. Second, some countries do not ratify ILO conventions as sometimes the exact
wording or the understanding of these conventions does not comply with national regulations or laws (OECD, 2000).
It is partly for this reason that the United States has ratified none of the ILO conventions on discrimination, but has
relatively low gender inequality in both the labour market and access to education.10
Within this modelling framework, an increase in the female labour-force participation
rate, that is, a decline in gender inequality, enhances the labour endowment and expands
or changes production possibilities with a bias towards labour-intensive goods.
12 As the
production of these goods increases relative to the other goods, the country improves (or
gains in) its comparative advantage. By modelling gender inequality in this way, we do
not consider any effect on welfare levels, since these depend on a number of assumptions
that are not the main focus of this paper. In particular, gender inequality itself is not
incorporated in the utility function. Such an approach is far beyond our methodology, and
therefore excluded from the analysis.
The impact of gender bias in educational attainment, conversely, may positively or
negatively affect comparative advantage in labour-intensive goods. A positive link would
be expected if firms take advantage of a well-educated and thus productive female labour
force, by employing them in low-paid export-oriented sectors of the economy. On the
other hand, if females are as well educated as males and are able to work in sectors and
professions they want, a better-trained female workforce would lead to a reduction in the
unskilled-labour endowment in the economy and, hence, would lead to a decline in
comparative advantage in (unskilled-)labour-intensive goods.
Finally, the impact of gender inequality in wages is more difficult to incorporate into this
modelling framework. In a Heckscher-Ohlin setting, relative factor prices across countries
(wages and capital rents) are equalised through the equalisation of relative commodity
prices (factor-price-equalisation theorem). This also applies to wages, as there are no
differences in the remuneration of females or males within a country (assuming no
productivity differences). Moreover, relative wages are the outcome of relative
commodity prices, not the other way around. Any existing gender wage gap would be
inefficient and costly to employers (Becker, 1971). Nevertheless, we do observe that male
workers may enjoy higher wages, which cannot be explained through differences in
                                                
12 In another Heckscher-Ohlin modelling approach, we could distinguish between unskilled and skilled labour as the
main factors of production. Yet the data for both types of labour are not available for a considerable number of
developing countries, which would severely reduce our country sample. Also, modelling gender inequality as a
change in the endowment of production factors is basically an application of the Rybczynski (1955) theorem. 11
labour productivity. Assuming persistent gender inequality in wages would then enable a
firm to gain a competitive advantage vis-à-vis firms in other countries (and competitors in
its own country). As a consequence, we would observe a stronger comparative advantage
in labour-intensive goods.
In general, gender inequality is unlikely to affect significantly the overall export
performance of a country, but rather the trade structure, that is, the composition of
exports, may be changed.
13 Importantly, there is considerable evidence that females
dominate certain export industries that are relatively labour intensive, such as textiles and
clothing (Table 2). Usually, these are sectors that employ a larger number of labourers
and provide relatively low wages (Seguino, 2000b). Yet it is unclear whether females in
developing and emerging market economies are working in these sectors due to a lack of
other job opportunities or by choice. Nevertheless, the employment patterns do indicate
considerable job segregation.
Table 2: Proportion of Females in Textiles and Clothing in Per Cent,
Selected Countries, 1984 and 1990
Textiles Clothing
Country 1984 1990 1984 1990
Columbia 34.3 n.a. 79.8 n.a.
Cyprus 66.5 72.3 83.2 86.5
Hong Kong 47.1 42.2 69.1 68.3
Malaysia 63.7 57.8 89.4 85.3
Philippines 46.6 48.4 80.0 79.6
Singapore 66.8 58.4 88.2 87.1
South Korea 65.7 57.3 76.7 72.0
Sri Lanka 57.5 50.8 89.1 89.4
Taiwan 64.7 64.7 80.2 80.2
Thailand 75.0 75.6 93.0 81.9
Source: Seguino (2000b); n.a.: not available.
Similar to textiles and clothing, other manufactured sectors that have a considerable share
of females are footwear, sporting goods, toys, or electronics (UNCTAD, 2004). In certain
countries, job opportunities for females may have been restricted to these specific export-
oriented sectors of the economy. Therefore, we restrict our analysis to labour-intensive12
manufactures, since the impact of gender inequality will be felt most strongly in these
sectors.
The relative labour intensity of manufactured goods is above all influenced by value
added per worker.
14 Table 3 shows all commodities and the corresponding SITC numbers
for labour-intensive commodities. Importantly, to check for the robustness of the results
we use two different categories: core labour-intensive goods, which consist of textiles,
apparel, glass products, footwear, or toys, and a broader range of these products, which
comprises all goods included in the core category plus labour-intensive electronics, such
as TVs, radios, telephone receivers, toasters, etc.










Textile yarn and fabric (65) x x
Glass, glassware and pottery (664-666) x x
Telecommunications apparatus (724) x
Domestic electrical equipment (725) x
Furniture and bedding (82) x x
Travel goods and handbags (83) x x
Apparel (84) x x
Footwear (85) x x
Baby carriages, games, toys, sporting goods (894) x x
Sources: Tyers et al. (1987) and own assembly.
We also differentiate between two different trade indicators to measure comparative
advantage in these commodities: First, Trade-exp1 and Trade-exp2 are computed as the
ratio of labour-intensive exports to total exports for the core and broader range of labour-
intensive goods, respectively; and, second, Trade-rca1 and Trade-rca2 stand for revealed
comparative advantage in these goods. Trade-rca1, for example, is calculated as follows:
                                                                                                                                                             
13 Though Seguino (1997, 2000a) found that a gender bias had an impact on the trade performance of Taiwan and
South Korea, it is unclear whether her results can be generalised for all developing countries. Specific circumstances
in these two countries may have contributed to their export success.
14 The data on labour-intensive commodities has been taken from Tyers et al. (1987).13
imports   total
exports   total
products   intensive - labour   core   of   imports
products   intensive - labour   core   of   exports
       rca1 - Trade         ) 1 ( =
The computation of Trade-rca2 is identical, except that the broader range of labour-
intensive products is used. All in all, that gives us four dependent variables, which allows
us to test the robustness of the empirical results.
As comparative advantage in a Heckscher-Ohlin framework is influenced by relative
factor endowments, two control variables are used in the benchmark regression:
•  Capital, which stands for the relative capital endowment, computed by average total
investment in the previous ten years, that is, the annual average of the period 1991 to
2000 for the capital stock in 2000, divided by the land area
•  Labour, measured as the total labour force in proportion to the land area, for the
relative labour endowment 
The first control variable is expected to be negatively associated with comparative
advantage in labour-intensive goods, whereas the second is likely to be positively
correlated with the four trade indicators. All countries reporting data for the dependent
and independent variables have been included in the data set. The exception is Singapore,
which has an extremely high labour density as a city-state. 
The cross-sectional analysis is based on data for the year 2000. The specification of the
basic trade model is as follows:
(2) Trade = α0 + α1 Capital + α2 Labour + α3 Regional dummies + α4 Control indicator
for gender inequality + α5 Indicator for gender inequality + e14
where Trade stands for the four trade indicators, e is an error term and αi are parameters.
Apart from adding indicators for gender inequality, we also control for the equivalent
aggregated indicators. If we focus on gender inequality in access to education, for
instance, we also control for total educational attainment for both males and females.
Moreover, a set of regional dummies in all cross-sectional regressions is included, to
allow for regional characteristics.
4.  Empirical Results
We start the presentation of the results of the linkage between trade flows and gender
inequality with those for the gender wage gap. As can be seen from the results for the first
four regressions, presented in columns 1 to 4 of Table 4, Capital and Labour have the
expected negative and positive signs and are statistically significant at the 1 and 5 per
cent level. The overall fit of the first two regressions is reasonable for such a
heterogeneous set of countries, but considerably higher for Trade-rca1 and Trade-rca2.
Whereas total wages in manufacturing (Wage)
15 as a further control variable has the
expected negative sign, it does not seem to be closely associated with the trade indicators.
Yet the gender wage gap always has a positive coefficient and a statistical significance at
the 5 per cent level. The sign of the parameter implies that a higher degree of gender
inequality in wages is positively associated with an improved comparative advantage in
labour-intensive goods. But we have to keep in mind that the country sample is restricted
to 29 countries, since only for these countries were total wage and gender wage data able
to be obtained for the year 2000.
16
                                                
15 Wage data in local currency units have been converted into US dollars using exchange rates from the World Bank
(2004) and, if provided on a weekly or monthly basis, have been converted into wages per hour.
16 See Appendix B for the list of countries included in the regressions for the gender wage gap.15
Table 4: Gender Wage Inequality and Comparative Advantage, All Countries
Cross-sectional analysis, 2000 Panel analysis (fixed-effects), 1975-2000






































































































2 0.30 0.18 0.59 0.47 0.80 0.81 0.72 0.80
F-value 2.5 1.8 6.1 4.2 16.6 17.3 10.9 16.2
N 29 29 29 29 161 161 161 161
Notes: See Appendix A for data sources; t-values, reported in parentheses, are based on White’s (1980)
correction for heteroskedasticity; multicollinearity has been tested by the creation of variance inflation
factors (VIF); all regressions pass at conventional levels; to save space, the coefficients for the regional
dummies are not shown; *** significant at 1% level; ** significant at 5% level; * significant at 10% level. 
Next, we examine the same linkage in a panel, employing data for 1975, 1980, 1985,
1990, 1995, and 2000. In general, panel (or pooled time-series) analysis can be performed
either by using a common intercept for all countries, the country-fixed effect or the
country-random model. While suitable F-tests suggested not using a common intercept for
all countries, Hausman (1978) test statistics indicated that the fixed-effects model would
be preferred.
17 The specification of the model is as follows:
(3) Trade = αc + α1 Capitalct + α2 Labourct + α3 Control indicator for gender inequalityct
+ α4 Indicator for gender inequalityct + Timet + ect
where αc is the country-specific fixed effect, Timet represents a time trend to incorporate
factors over time that are likely to have an effect on the countries in the sample and ect
(for country c and period t) is an error term.16
In comparison to the cross-sectional analysis, we were able to include eleven further
countries, as these countries report wage data for two or more contiguous periods in 1975
to 2000. Yet two countries, Botswana and Brazil, which were included in the cross-
sectional analysis, had to be excluded in the panel analysis, as there are no observations
over time available. In all, that expands the country sample to 38 countries. As can be
seen in columns 5 to 8 of Table 4, the overall fit is reasonable, but the first two control
variables do not always have the expected sign and/or are significant. These results might
be due to the limited number of countries and contiguous periods for which wage data
were available. Wage is still negative in all regressions and significant in the first two
regressions (columns 5 and 6). Crucially, Wage-inequality is always positive and
significant, implying that the positive linkage holds over time. This is an important result,
as countries with higher wage inequality may exploit their comparative advantage in
labour-intensive commodities in comparison to other countries with a similar factor
endowment but less gender wage inequality.
Next, we explore the linkage between comparative advantage in labour-intensive goods
and gender inequality in labour force participation rates (Lab-inequality). The results for
the cross-sectional analysis, reported in columns 1 to 4 of Table 5, indicate that variations
in the female/male labour force participation rates are statistically significant and
positively associated with the two indicators for labour-intensive exports as a share of
total exports, but not significant if we use the two measures for revealed comparative
advantage. In addition, the overall fit of the regressions is higher in the first two trade
regressions.
The results for the panel analysis, on the other hand, clearly show a positive and
significant link between gender inequality in labour force participation rates and
comparative advantage. Crucially, the panel analysis not only has the advantage of many
more observations, but it also allows us to explore the linkages over time, that is, the
dynamics of changes in both the dependent and the independent variables. The estimated
                                                                                                                                                             
17 This also applies to the following regressions for the other two gender inequality indicators.17
positive sign for Lab-inequality is in line with the theoretically expected outcome, as a
higher female labour force will enhance the labour endowment and, thus, comparative
advantage in labour-intensive commodities. In other words: Less gender inequality in
labour market participation rates is associated with a stronger comparative advantage,
taking other country characteristics into account.
18
Table 5: Gender Inequality in Labour Force Participation Rates and Comparative
Advantage, All Countries
Cross-sectional analysis, 2000 Panel analysis (fixed-effects), 1975-2000






















































































2 0.48 0.46 0.28 0.39 0.81 0.82 0.67 0.74
F-value 12.3 11.7 5.9 8.7 20.7 21.7 10.6 14.4
N 88 88 88 88 443 443 443 443
Note: Four countries that did not report trade data for the year 2000 had to be excluded from the cross-
sectional, but not from the panel data analysis; see Table 4 for further notes.
The results might have been influenced by the inclusion of high-income countries, which
usually have a relatively low share of labour-intensive exports in total exports (and no or
very little comparative advantage in these goods). For that reason, sign and significance
of the coefficients of the gender inequality indicators might be biased. To further examine
the robustness of the results, high-income countries have been excluded in a second set of
regressions. Only low- and middle-income countries, namely countries with a GNI per
capita in 2000 of 9,206 US dollars or less according to a definition by the World Bank
                                                
18 To check the robustness of the results, we also used several other measures of gender inequality, for instance, by
taking female labour force participation rates (excluding male participation rates) or the share of females in the total
labour force. Essentially, the results do not differ much with respect to sign and significance of the estimated
coefficients. To save space, the results are not reported. 18
(2004), were incorporated in the regressions. Along these lines, the focus is on relatively
poor countries, where gender inequality might be a problem of higher importance in
comparison to higher-income countries. In total, 70 developing countries have been
singled out, using the World Bank definition for our country sample.
19
As can be seen from Table 6, the results in the cross-sectional analysis do hold up. The
sign of the coefficients are identical, though the statistical significance is somewhat
weaker in comparison to the regressions for the full country sample. On the other hand,
the linkage does not hold over time, as Lab-inequality still is positive but not significant
in the panel analysis. Overall, the extent of gender inequality is positively associated with
comparative advantage in labour-intensive goods, though the relationship is stronger if all
countries are included in the sample. 
Table 6: Gender Inequality in Labour Force Participation Rates and Comparative
Advantage, Developing Countries
Cross-sectional analysis, 2000 Panel analysis (fixed-effects), 1975-2000






















































































2 0.49 0.50 0.29 0.43 0.81 0.81 0.67 0.75
F-value 11.2 11.9 5.4 9.0 19.1 19.5 9.7 13.5
N 66 66 66 66 311 311 311 311
See Table 4 for notes.
Finally, the relationship between female/male differences in access to education and trade
in labour-intensive products is examined. We add Education  to the regressions,
                                                
19 Again, due to data deficiencies, four developing countries had to be excluded from the cross-sectional analysis, but19
representing total literacy rates and total gross secondary school enrolment, both weighted
50 per cent, to control for total educational attainment. The results for all countries in the
cross-sectional analysis, reported in columns 1 to 4 of Table  7, do not indicate a
statistically significant link between female/male educational attainment and comparative
advantage in labour-intensive goods. If we look at changes over time (columns 5 to 8), on
the other hand, we observe a very strong positive link, that is, less gender inequality in
access to education is positively associated with comparative advantage. If we exclude
high-income countries, the picture is very similar, except that Edu-inequality is now
significant at the 5 per cent instead of the 1 per cent level (Table 8).
20
Table 7: Gender Inequality in Access to Education and Comparative Advantage, All
Countries
Cross-sectional analysis, 2000 Panel analysis (fixed-effects), 1975-2000






































































































2 0.41 0.42 0.31 0.41 0.82 0.83 0.68 0.75
F-value 8.7 8.9 5.8 8.4 22.1 23.0 10.9 15.1
N 88 88 88 88 443 443 443 443
See Table 4 for notes.
                                                                                                                                                             
not from the pooled times-series analysis.
20  Importantly, these results do not change much if the income threshold is set at a lower level, for instance,
US $2,975 per capita, representing the income level for low- and lower-middle-income countries.20
Table 8: Gender Inequality in Access to Education and Comparative Advantage,
Developing Countries
Cross-sectional analysis, 2000 Panel analysis (fixed-effects), 1975-2000






































































































2 0.37 0.38 0.34 0.47 0.82 0.83 0.68 0.76
F-value 7.5 7.6 5.6 9.0 20.1 20.7 9.84 14.1
N 66 66 66 66 311 311 311 311
See Table 4 for notes.
Summing up the empirical evidence, our results show that there is a positive linkage
between comparative advantage in labour-intensive goods and gender wage inequality and
a negative link with respect to gender inequality in labour market participation rates and
access to education. While the links between trade and gender inequality in labour-market
participation rates and educational attainment are somewhat weaker, depending on
whether all countries or just developing countries are included or whether a particular
trade indicator for comparative advantage has been used, the clearest link (in terms of
statistical significance) can be established regarding the gender wage gap, as firms may
exploit wage discrimination to gain or enhance a comparative advantage in labour-
intensive products. 
Overall, these results are in line with those of Seguino (1997, 2000ab), who showed that
wage differentials can boost total exports in export-oriented semi-industrialised countries.
On the other hand, we carefully differentiate between total exports and the export
structure. If a country has a very strong (and maybe increasing) comparative advantage in21
labour-intensive goods, that does not automatically imply higher GNI growth rates, as the
country might be locked to the production of these commodities and might not be able to
switch to higher-valued goods over time. If that is the case, we do not expect a significant
impact on growth rates. There might even be a negative influence if prices for labour-
intensive products fall over time as competition increases.
Against this background, our results do not contradict the empirical evidence on the
negative link between economic growth and gender inequality reported by Drèze and Sen
(1989), Pritchett and Summers (1996), and Klasen (2002). What our results do indicate,
however, is that developing countries with less gender wage inequality might be
negatively affected, as their comparative advantage in labour-intensive commodities may
erode if other countries with a similar factor endowment rely on females in their export
sector. Also, the results imply that industrialised countries do not have a problem with
gender inequality in developing countries; they may even “profit” from its occurrence due
to possibly lower prices for labour-intensive goods.
5.  Policy Implications and Concluding Remarks
As there is some cause for concern regarding the linkage between gender inequality and
comparative advantage in labour-intensive goods, the question might arise as to whether
sanctions – on an international level – should be imposed on commodities from countries
with poor fundamental labour standards, such as high gender inequality in wage
remuneration. Supporters of this position, who usually come from high-income OECD
countries, argue for connecting trade and labour standards, if possible within the WTO
framework, thereby punishing developing countries that do not observe basic standards
and/or giving them an incentive to raise those standards, that is, to reduce gender
inequality.
Though sanctions are popular, the effectiveness of trade sanctions as an instrument is
highly questionable. In a large number of cases, countries do not change their behaviour22
because sanctions have been imposed on them (Hufbauer and Elliot, 1999). What is more,
this instrument focuses only on export industries and does not tackle gender bias in other
areas. Trade sanctions may drive females to other sectors with potentially even lower
labour standards. Regarding child labour, a closely related core labour standard, there is
evidence that the effects of sanctions were unsatisfactory in some developing countries. In
Bangladesh, for example, children were thrown out of their jobs in the garment industry
as a result of boycott pressures by the United States, with most children ending up in far
more dangerous employment, such as welding and prostitution (UNICEF, 1997). 
Finally, the inclusion of labour standards in the WTO framework may even be exploited
by high-income countries to protect their markets against allegedly “unfair” imports from
poorer countries with lower standards.
21 That is exactly what developing countries fear, as
high-income countries like those of the European Union are still calling for discussion of
links between trade and fundamental workers' rights like gender discrimination. The
European Union brought the issue forward at the WTO conference in Doha in November
2001, but that attempt was rejected by several developing countries. Consequently, all
parties agreed that the issue of core labour standards remain in the sphere of influence of
the ILO. Since trade unions, human right activists and some governments of high-income
countries show an ongoing interest in the matter, it is highly likely that the issue of
gender inequality will reappear on the international trade policy agenda. Moreover, taking
our results into account, in particular the linkage between comparative advantage and the
gender wage gap, the need to tackle the issue on the international agenda becomes
understandable.
However, if sanctions within the WTO framework are not appropriate as an effective
policy instrument, it remains open as to how to deal with gender inequality and
consequences such as the gender wage gap. From our point of view, two things are
important. First, it is rather obvious that relatively poor developing countries should be
able to enhance their GNI growth rates, as gender inequality is – on average – negatively
                                                
21 See Bhagwati (1996) for a discussion on the political economy of labour standards and international trade.23
associated with income levels.
22 Imposing trade restrictions that also reduce trade and
foreign (and domestic) investment would be thus counterproductive, as important
determinants of economic growth are negatively affected. More importantly, improving
the monitoring and surveillance by the ILO would serve as an encouragement, as there is
evidence that most governments respond to complaints presented under the formal
procedures of the ILO (OECD, 2000; ILO, 2003a). In addition, the ILO could provide
technical assistance to very poor developing countries which may lack the required skills.
On the other hand, if monitoring and surveillance do not work effectively, one may have
to reconsider the issue of strengthening ILO enforcement powers.
                                                
22 For cultural and historical reasons, some high-income Arab countries clearly do not fit into this picture. See Busse
(2004) for an analysis of the determinants of gender inequality. 24
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Appendix A: Definition of Variables and Data Sources
Variable Definition Source
GNI Gross national income per capita in current US dollars (‘000),
based on purchasing power parity (PPP) exchange rates 
World Bank (2004)
Trade-exp1 Exports of labour-intensive manufactured goods divided by
total exports of goods, core products
ITC (2004)
Trade-exp2 Exports of unskilled-labour-intensive manufactured goods
divided by total exports of goods, broader range of products
ITC (2004)
Trade-rca1 Revealed comparative advantage in labour-intensive
manufactured goods, core products
ITC (2004)
Trade-rca2 Revealed comparative advantage in labour-intensive
manufactured goods, broader range of products
ITC (2004)
Capital Total capital stock, annual average of ten years before the
considered period, i.e., average investment in the period
1991-2000 for Capital2000, divided by land area
(1,000,000 sq. km of land)
World Bank (2004)
Labour Total labour force divided by land area (1,000,000 sq. km of
land) 
World Bank (2004)
Convention Number of ratifications of the two fundamental ILO
conventions on female discrimination No. 100 and No. 111,
31 December 2000
ILO (2004a)
Education Total educational attainment rate, based on gross secondary
school enrolment rate (in %) and adult literacy rate (in %),
both weighted 50 per cent
World Bank (2004)




Wage-inequality Gender wage gap in (labour-intensive) manufacturing,
(1 minus (female divided by male wage rate)) times 100
ILO (2003b, 2004b)
Lab-inequality Female divided by male labour force activity rate, ages 15-64 World Bank (2004)
Edu-inequality Female divided by male educational attainment rate, that is,
the average of the gross secondary school enrolment rate





Set of five regional dummy variables: (1) Sub-Saharan
Africa, (2) Asia & the Pacific, (3) Middle East & North
Africa, (4) Latin America & the Caribbean, (5) High-income
countries
World Bank (2004)28
Appendix B: Country Sample
Algeria, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bangladesh, Barbados, Benin, Bolivia,  Botswana,  Brazil,
Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Canada, Central African Republic, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa
Rica, Cote d'Ivoire, Cyprus, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Ethiopia,
Fiji,  Finland,  France,  Gambia, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Guyana, Honduras, Iceland, India,
Indonesia, Iran, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Republic of Korea, Lesotho,
Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Mali, Mauritius,  Mexico, Morocco, Nepal, Netherlands,  New
Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru,
Philippines, Portugal, Rwanda, Senegal, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Swaziland, Sweden,
Switzerland, Syrian Arab Republic, Tanzania,  Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia,
Turkey, United Kingdom, United States, Uruguay, Venezuela, Zambia, Zimbabwe.
Notes: The countries in italics are high-income countries (World Bank (2004) definition) that have been
excluded from the regressions that focus on developing countries, and those in bold are included in the
Wage-inequality regressions (cross-sectional and/or panel analysis).